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ABSTRACT
This paper studies optimal .scal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The
theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy without capital. The government finances
an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and
issuing one-period nominally risk-free bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a
miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates)the
optimal volatility of in.ation is near zero. This result stands in stark contrast with the high volatility
of inflation implied by the Ramsey allocation when prices are flexible. The finding is in line with
a recent body of work on optimal monetary policy under nominal rigidities that ignores the role of
optimal fiscal policy. Second, even small deviations from full price flexibility induce near random
walk behavior in government debt and tax rates, as in economies with real non-state-contingent debt
only. Finally, sluggish price adjustment raises the average nominal interest rate above the one called
for by the Friedman rule.
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé Martín Uribe
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Rutgers University University of Pennsylvania
New Brunswick, NJ 08901 3718 Locust Walk
and NBER, CEPR Philadelphia, PA 19104
grohe@econ.rutgers.edu and NBER
uribe@econ.upenn.edu1 Introduction
Two distinct branches of the existing literature on optimal monetary policy deliver diametrically
opposed policy recommendations concerning the long-run and cyclical behavior of prices and in-
terest rates. One branch follows the theoretical framework laid out in Lucas and Stokey (1983). It
studies the joint determination of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in ﬂexible-price environments
with perfect competition in product and factor markets. In this group of papers, the government’s
problem consists in ﬁnancing an exogenous stream of public spending by choosing the least disrup-
tive combination of inﬂation and distortionary income taxes. The criterion under which policies
are evaluated is the welfare of the representative private agent.1
In a signiﬁcant contribution to the literature, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991)characterize
optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in stochastic environments with nominal non-state-contingent
public debt. A key result of Chari et al. is that the government ﬁnds it optimal to make the
inﬂation rate highly volatile and serially uncorrelated. Under the Ramsey policy, the government
uses unanticipated inﬂation as a lump-sum tax on ﬁnancial wealth. The government is able to do
this because public debt is nominal and non-state-contingent. Thus, price changes play the role of
a shock absorber of unexpected innovations in the ﬁscal deﬁcit. This ‘front-loading’ of government
revenues via inﬂationary shocks allows the government to keep income tax rates remarkably stable
over the business cycle.
On the other hand, a more recent literature focuses on characterizing optimal monetary policy
in environments with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition.2 Besides its emphasis on the
role of price rigidities and market power, this literature diﬀers from the earlier one described above
in two important ways. First, it assumes, either explicitly or implicitly, that the government has
access to (endogenous)lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance its budget. An important implication of this
assumption is that there is no need to use unanticipated inﬂation as a lump-sum tax; regular
lump-sum taxes take up this role. Second, the government is assumed to be able to implement a
production (or employment)subsidy so as to eliminate the distortion introduced by the presence
of monopoly power in product and factor markets.
A key result of this literature is that the optimal monetary policy features an inﬂation rate that
is zero or close to zero at all dates and all states.3 The reason why price stability turns out to be
optimal in environments of the type described here is straightforward: the government keeps the
price level constant in order to minimize (or completely eliminate)the costs introduced by inﬂation
under nominal rigidities.
Taken together, these two strands of research on optimal monetary policy leave the monetary
authority without a clear policy recommendation. Should the central bank pursue policies that
imply high or low inﬂation volatility? The goal of this paper is to contribute to the resolution of
this policy dilemma. To this end, it incorporates in a uniﬁed framework the essential elements of
the two approaches to optimal policy described above. Speciﬁcally, we build a model that shares
three elements with the earlier literature: (a)The only source of regular taxation available to the
1See, for example, Chari et al. (1991), Correia and Teles (1996), Guidotti and V´ egh (1993), and Kimbrough (1986).
2See, for example, Erceg et al. (2000), Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2000), Khan, King, and Wolman (2000), Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999), Woodford (1999), and Woodford (2000).
3In models where money is used exclusively as a medium of account or when money enters in an additively
separable way in the utility function, the optimal inﬂation rate is typically strictly zero. Khan, King, and Wolman
(2000) show that when a nontrivial transaction role for money is introduced, the optimal inﬂation rate lies between
zero and the one called for by the Friedman rule. However, in calibrated model economies they ﬁnd that the optimal
rate of inﬂation is in fact very close to zero and smooth. Erceg et al. (2000) show that in models with sluggish price
adjustment in product as well as factor markets price stability is suboptimal. Yet, for realistic calibrations of their
model, the optimal inﬂation volatility is close to zero.
1government is distortionary income taxes. In particular, the ﬁscal authority cannot adjust lump-
sum taxes endogenously in ﬁnancing its outlays. (b)The government cannot implement production
subsidies to undo distortions created by the presence of imperfect competition. (c)The government
issues only nominal, one-period, non-state-contingent bonds. At the same time, our model shares
two important assumptions with the more recent body of work on optimal monetary policy: (a)
Product markets are not perfectly competitive. In particular, we assume that each ﬁrm in the
economy is the monopolistic producer of a diﬀerentiated intermediate good. (b)Product prices are
assumed to be sticky. We introduce price stickiness ` a la Rotemberg (1982)by assuming that ﬁrms
face a convex cost of price adjustment. An assumption maintained throughout this paper that is
common to all of the papers cited above (except for Lucas and Stokey, 1983)is that the government
has the ability to fully commit to the implementation of announced ﬁscal and monetary policies.
In this environment, the government faces a tradeoﬀ in choosing the path of inﬂation. On the
one hand, the government would like to use unexpected inﬂation as a non-distorting tax on nominal
wealth. In this way the ﬁscal authority can minimize the need to vary distortionary income taxes
over the business cycle. On the other hand, changes in the rate of inﬂation come at a cost, for
ﬁrms face nominal rigidities.4 The main result of this paper is that under plausible calibrations of
the degree of price stickiness, this trade oﬀ is overwhelmingly resolved in favor of price stability.
The optimal ﬁscal/monetary regime features relatively low inﬂation volatility. Thus, the Ramsey
allocation delivers an inﬂation process that is more in line with the predictions of the more recent
body of literature on optimal monetary policy referred to above, which ignores ﬁscal constraints by
assuming that the government can resort to lump-sum taxation. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a miniscule
amount of price stickiness suﬃces to bring the optimal degree of inﬂation volatility close to zero.
Speciﬁcally, our results suggest that for a degree of price stickiness that is ten times smaller than
available estimates for the U.S. economy, price stability emerges as the central feature of optimal
monetary policy.
The fragility of front-loading government revenue via surprise changes in the price level reveals
that the welfare gains of this way of government ﬁnancing must be small. To understand why this
is so, it is useful to relate price stickiness to the ability of the government to make nominally non-
state-contingent debt state contingent in real terms. Under full price ﬂexibility, the government
uses unexpected variations in the price level to render the real return on nominal bonds state
contingent. Under price stickiness, this practice is costly for ﬁrms are subject to price adjustment
costs. It follows that as price adjustment costs become large, the Ramsey planner is less likely to
use variations in the price level to create state-contingent real debt. Thus, the more sticky prices
are, the more the economy will resemble one without real state-contingent debt. Recent work by
Marcet et al. (2000)shows that the level of welfare in Ramsey economies with and without real
state-contingent debt is virtually the same. As a consequence, in the sticky-price model studied
in this paper, the Ramsey planner is willing to give up front-loading all together to avoid price
adjustment costs even when such costs are fairly small.
Indeed, in ﬁnancing the budget the Ramsey planner replaces front-loading with standard debt
and tax instruments. For example, in response to an unexpected increase in government spending
the planner does not generate a surprise increase in the price level. Instead, he chooses to ﬁnance
the increase in government purchases partly through an increase in income tax rates and partly
through an increase in public debt. The planner minimizes the tax distortion by spreading the
required tax increase over many periods. This tax-smoothing behavior induces near-random walk
dynamics into the tax rate and public debt. By contrast, under full price ﬂexibility (i.e., when the
4Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) and Sims (2001) also remark on the desirability of quantitatively investigating
the costs and beneﬁts of price volatility in models with sluggish price adjustment.
2government can create real-state contingent debt)tax rates and public debt inherit the stochastic
process of the underlying shocks.
An important conclusion of our study is thus that the Barro-Marcet-Sargent-Seppala result,
namely, that optimal policy imposes a near random walk behavior on taxes and debt, does not
require the unrealistic assumption that the government can issue only non-state-contingent real
debt. This result emerges naturally in economies with nominally non-state contingent debt, clearly
the case of greatest empirical relevance, and a minimum amount of price rigidity.
The remainder of the paper is organized in 8 sections. Section 2 describes the economic envi-
ronment and deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium. Section 3 presents the Ramsey problem. Section 4
analyzes the business-cycle properties of Ramsey allocations. It ﬁrst describes the calibration of the
model. Then it presents the central result of the paper, namely, that even under very small price
adjustment costs the optimal inﬂation volatility is near zero. Section 5 shows that when prices are
sticky, public debt and tax rates are near random walk processes whereas when prices are ﬂexible
they have a strong mean reverting component. Section 6 shows that price-stickiness introduces
deviations from the Friedman rule. Section 7 presents a discussion of the accuracy of the numerical
solution method. Section 8 investigates whether the time series process for the nominal interest
rate implied by the Ramsey policy can be represented as a Taylor-type interest rate feedback rule.
Finally, section 9 presents concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section we develop a simple inﬁnite-horizon production economy with imperfectly competi-
tive product markets and sticky prices. A demand for money is motivated by assuming that money
facilitates transactions. The government ﬁnances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying
distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing one-period nominally risk-free bonds.
2.1 The Private Sector
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical households. Each household has





where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes labor eﬀort, β ∈ (0,1)denotes the subjective discount
factor, and E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information available
in period 0. The single period utility function U is assumed to be increasing in consumption,
decreasing in eﬀort, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
In each period t ≥ 0, households can acquire two types of ﬁnancial assets: ﬁat money, Mt,
and one-period, state-contingent, nominal assets, Dt+1, that pay the random amount Dt+1 of
currency in a particular state of period t+1. Money facilitates consumption purchases. Speciﬁcally,
consumption purchases are subject to a proportional transaction cost s(vt)that depends on the





where Pt denotes the price of the consumption good in period t. The transaction cost function
satisﬁes the following assumption:
3Assumption 1 The function s(v) satisﬁes: (a) s(v) is nonnegative and twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable;(b) There exists a level of velocity v > 0, to which we refer as the satiation level of money,
such that s(v)=s (v)=0 ;(c) (v−v)s (v) > 0 for v  = v;and (d) 2s (v)+vs  (v) > 0 for all v ≥ v.
Assumption 1(b)ensures that the Friedman rule, i.e., a zero nominal interest rate, need not be
associated with an inﬁnite demand for money. It also implies that both the transaction cost and the
distortion it introduces vanish when the nominal interest rate is zero. Assumption 1(c)guarantees
that in equilibrium money velocity is always greater than or equal to the satiation level. As will
become clear shortly, assumption 1(d)ensures that the demand for money is decreasing in the
nominal interest rate. (Note that assumption 1(d)is weaker than the more common assumption of
strict convexity of the transaction cost function.)
The consumption good ct is assumed to be a composite good made of a continuum of interme-
diate diﬀerentiated goods. The aggregator function is of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. Each household
is the monopolistic producer of one variety of intermediate goods. The intermediate goods are
produced using a linear technology, zt˜ ht,t h a tt a k e sl a b o r ,˜ ht, as the sole input and is subject
to an exogenous productivity shock, zt. The household hires labor from a perfectly competitive
market. The demand for the intermediate input is of the form Ytd(pt),w h e r e Yt denotes the level
of aggregate demand and pt denotes the relative price of the intermediate good in terms of the
composite consumption good. The relative price pt is deﬁned as ˜ Pt/Pt,w h e r e ˜ Pt is the nominal
price of the intermediate good produced by the household and Pt is the price of the composite
consumption good. The demand function d(·)is assumed to be decreasing and to satisfy d(1)= 1
and d (1) < −1. The restrictions on d(1)and d (1)are necessary for the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium. The monopolist sets the price of the good it supplies taking the level of aggregate
demand as given, and is constrained to satisfy demand at that price, that is,
zt˜ ht ≥ Ytd(pt). (3)
We follow Rotemberg (1982)and introduce sluggish price adjustment by assuming that the ﬁrm
faces a resource cost that is quadratic in the inﬂation rate of the good it produces









The parameter θ measures the degree of price stickiness. The higher is θ the more sluggish is the
adjustment of nominal prices. If θ = 0, then prices are ﬂexible.
The ﬂow budget constraint of the household in period t is then given by:



















+(1 − τt)Ptwtht, (4)
where wt is the real wage rate and τt is the labor income tax rate. The variable rt+1 denotes the
period-t price of a claim to one unit of currency in a particular state of period t+1 divided by the
probability of occurrence of that state conditional on information available in period t.T h el e f t -
hand side of the budget constraint represents the uses of wealth: consumption spending, including
transactions costs, money holdings, and purchases of interest bearing assets. The right-hand side
shows the sources of wealth: money, the payoﬀ of contingent claims acquired in the previous period,
proﬁts from the sale of the diﬀerentiated good net of the price-adjustment cost, and after-tax labor
income.
4In addition, the household is subject to the following borrowing constraint that prevents it from
engaging in Ponzi schemes:
lim
j→∞
Etqt+j+1(Dt+j+1 + Mt+j) ≥ 0, (5)
at all dates and under all contingencies. The variable qt represents the period-zero price of one unit
of currency to be delivered in a particular state of period t divided by the probability of occurrence
of that state given information available at time 0 and is given by
qt = r1r2 ...r t,
with q0 ≡ 1.
The household chooses the set of processes {ct,h t,˜ ht, ˜ Pt,v t,M t,D t+1}∞
t=0, so as to maximize
(1) subject to (2)-(5), taking as given the set of processes {Yt,P t,w t,r t+1,τ t,z t}∞
t=0 and the initial
condition M−1 + D0.
Let the multiplier on the ﬂow budget constraint be λt/Pt and the one on the production con-
straint be mctλt/Pt. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions of the household’s maximization problem
are (2)-(5) holding with equality and




















0=λt[Ytd(pt)+ptYtd (pt) − θπt(πtpt/pt−1 − 1) − mctYtd (pt)]
+βθEtλt+1πt+1(πt+1pt+1/pt − 1)pt+1/pt
2, (11)
where πt = Pt/Pt−1 denotes gross consumer price inﬂation. The interpretation of these optimality
conditions is straightforward. The ﬁrst-order condition (6)states that the transaction cost intro-
duces a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth.
The assumed form of the transaction cost function ensures that this wedge is zero at the satiation
point v and increasing in money velocity for v>v . Equation (7)shows that both the labor income
tax rate and the transaction cost distort the consumption/leisure margin. Given the wage rate,
households will tend to work less and consume less the higher is τ or the smaller is vt. Equation (8)
implicitly deﬁnes the household’s money demand function. Note that Etrt+1 is the period-t price
of an asset that pays one unit of currency in every state in period t+1. ThusEtrt+1 represents the
inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate. Formally, letting Rt denote the gross risk-free




5Our assumptions about the form of the transactions cost function imply that the demand for money
is strictly decreasing in the nominal interest rate and unit elastic in consumption. Equation (9)
represents a standard pricing equation for one-step-ahead nominal contingent claims. Equation (10)
states that marginal cost equals the ratio of wages to the marginal product of labor. Finally,
equation (11)states that the presence of price-adjustment costs prevent ﬁrms in the short run from
setting their prices so as to equate marginal revenue, pt + d(pt)/d (pt), to marginal cost, mct.
2.2 The Government
The government faces a stream of public consumption, denoted by gt, that is exogenous, stochastic,
and unproductive. These expenditures are ﬁnanced by levying labor income taxes at the rate τt,b y
printing money, and by issuing one-period, risk-free (non-contingent), nominal obligations, which
we denote by Bt. The government’s sequential budget constraint is then given by
Mt + Bt = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt − τtPtwtht
for t ≥ 0. The monetary/ﬁscal regime consists in the announcement of state-contingent plans for
the nominal interest rate and the tax rate, {Rt,τ t}.
2.3 Equilibrium
We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria where all households charge the same price for the
good they produce. As a result, we have that pt =1f o ra l lt. It then follows from the fact that
all ﬁrms face the same wage rate, the same technology shock, and the same production technology,
that they all hire the same amount of labor. That is, ˜ ht = ht. Also, because all ﬁrms charge the
same price, we have that the marginal revenue of the individual monopolist is constant and equal
to 1 + 1/d (1). Let
η = d (1)
denote the equilibrium value of the elasticity of demand faced by the monopolist. Then in equilib-
rium equation (11)gives rise to the following expectations augmented Phillips curve











This neo-Keynesian feature of the model is a standard element in the recent related literature on
optimal monetary policy.
Because all households are identical, in equilibrium there is no borrowing or lending among
them. Thus, all interest-bearing asset holdings by private agents are in the form of government
securities. That is,
Dt = Rt−1Bt−1
at all dates and all contingencies. Finally, in equilibrium, it must be the case that the nominal
interest rate is non-negative,
Rt ≥ 1.
Otherwise pure arbitrage opportunities would exist and households’ demand for consumption would
not be well deﬁned.
6We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium is a set of plans {ct,h t,
Mt,B t,v t,m c t,λ t,P t,q t,r t+1} satisfying the following conditions:






























Mt + Bt + τtPtztmctht = Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Ptgt (19)
lim
j→∞
Etqt+j+1(Rt+jBt+j + Mt+j)= 0 (20)
qt = r1r2 ...r t with q0 = 1 (21)
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt +
θ
2
(πt − 1)2 = ztht (22)
vt = Ptct/Mt, (23)
given policies {Rt,τ t}, exogenous processes {zt,g t}, and the initial condition R−1B−1 + M−1 > 0.
3T h e R a m s e y P r o b l e m
The optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy is the process {Rt,τ t} associated with the competitive
equilibrium that yields the highest level of utility to the representative household, that is, that
maximizes (1). As is well known, in the absence of price stickiness, the Ramsey planner will always
ﬁnd it optimal to conﬁscate the entire initial nominal wealth of the household by choosing a policy
that results in an inﬁnite initial price level, P0 = ∞. This is because such a conﬁscation amounts to
a nondistortionary lump-sum tax. To avoid this unrealistic feature of optimal policy, it is typically
assumed in the ﬂexible price literature that the initial price level is given. We follow this tradition
here to make our results comparable to this literature. However, we note that in the presence of
7price adjustment costs it may not be optimal for the Ramsey planner to choose P0 = ∞.T h e
reason is twofold. First, such policy would be distortionary as it would introduce a large deviation
of marginal cost from marginal revenue. Second, an inﬁnitely large initial inﬂation would absorb
a large number of resources because the implementation of price changes requires the use of real
resources.
A key diﬀerence between our model with sticky prices and non-state-contingent nominal govern-
ment debt and models with ﬂexible prices (such as Chari et al., 1991)or models with sticky prices
but state-contingent debt (like the model considered by Correia et al., 2001)is that in our model
the primal form of the competitive equilibrium can no longer be reduced to a single intertemporal
implementability (budget)constraint in period 0 and a feasibility constraint holding in every period.
This feature of the Ramsey problem is akin to the one identiﬁed by Marcet, Sargent and Seppala
(2000)in their analysis of optimal policy in a real economy without state-contingent debt. The
reason why under sticky prices and nominally non-state contingent debt the Ramsey constraints
cannot be stated in terms of a single time-zero implementability constraint is the following. Under
price ﬂexibility, given a real allocation, the path for prices is uniquely determined in such a way that
it ensures that the implied real return on nominal debt satisﬁes the transversality condition of the
competitive equilibrium at all dates and all states. Under price stickiness, the price path is more
constrained for it must also satisfy the expectations augmented Phillips curve. However, a price
path that satisﬁes the expectations augmented Phillips curve and a time-zero implementability
constraint may not result in state-contingent real government debt that satisﬁes the transversality
condition of the competitive equilibrium (eqn. 20)at all dates and under all contingencies.
The following proposition presents a simpler form of the competitive equilibrium.5
Proposition 1 Plans {ct,h t,v t,π t,λ t,b t,mc t}∞












































vt ≥ v and v2
ts (vt) < 1,
for all dates and under all contingencies given (R−1B−1 + M−1)/P−1, are the same as those satis-
fying (13)-(23), where
γ(vt) ≡ 1+s(vt)+vts (vt)
and
ρ(vt) ≡ 1/[1 − v2
ts (vt)].
5The competitive equilibrium could be simpliﬁed further by using (13) and (18) to eliminate λt and mct.
8Proof: See appendix A.
We will assume that the government has the ability to commit to the contingent policy rules it
announces at date 0. It then follows from proposition 1 that the Ramsey problem can be stated as
choosing contingent plans ct,h t,v t,π t,λ t,b t,a n dmct so as to maximize (1) subject to (13), (18),
(22), (24)-(26), vt ≥ v,a n dv2
ts (vt) < 1, taking as given (M−1 + R−1B−1)/P0 and the exogenous
stochastic processes gt and zt. The Lagrangian of the Ramsey planner’s problem as well as the
associated ﬁrst-order conditions are shown in appendix B.
3.1 Alternative representation of the Ramsey constraints
While it is not possible to reduce the constraints of the Ramsey problem to a single intertemporal
budget constraint in period 0 and one feasibility constraint holding at every date and at every
state, as is the case under price ﬂexibility, it is possible to express the set of constraints the Ramsey
planner faces in terms of a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints rather than in terms
of the sequence of transversality conditions given in (26). The next proposition presents such a
representation.
Proposition 2 Plans {ct,h t,v t,π t,b t,mc t}∞
t=0 satisfying the feasibility constraint (22), the expec-
tations augmented Phillips curve

































































and the boundary conditions on vt
vt ≥ v and v2
ts (vt) < 1,
for all dates and under all contingencies given (R−1B−1 + M−1)/P−1, are the same as those satis-
fying the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium, that is, (13)-(23).
Proof: See appendix C.
This more compact representation of the restrictions of a competitive equilibrium facilitates
comparison with the those arising in real economies without state-contingent debt (Marcet et al.
2000).
94 Optimal Inﬂation Volatility
In this section we characterize numerically the dynamic properties of Ramsey allocations. We
compute dynamics by solving ﬁrst- and second-order logarithmic approximations to the Ramsey
planner’s policy functions around a non-stochastic Ramsey steady state. We ﬁrst describe the
calibration of the model and then present the quantitative results.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy. The time unit is meant to be a year. We assume
that up to period 0, the economy is in the non-stochastic steady state of a competitive equilibrium
with constant paths for consumption, hours, nominal interest rates, inﬂation, tax rates, etc. To
facilitate comparison to the case of price ﬂexibility we adopt, where possible, the calibration of
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a). Speciﬁcally, we assume that in the steady state the inﬂation
rate is 4.2 percent per year, which is consistent with the average growth rate of the U.S. GDP
deﬂator over the period 1960:Q1 to 1998:Q3, that the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.44 percent, which
corresponds to the ﬁgure observed in the United States in 1995 (see the 1997 Economic Report
of the President, table B-79), and that government expenditures are equal to 20 percent of GDP,
a ﬁgure that is in line with postwar U.S. data. We follow Prescott (1986)and set the subjective
discount rate β to 0.96 to be consistent with a steady-state real rate of return of 4 percent per year.
Table 1: Calibration
Symbol Deﬁnition Value Description
Calibrated Parameters:
β 0.96 Subjective discount factor
π 1.042 Gross inﬂation rate
h 0.2 Fraction of time allocated to work
sg g/y 0.2 Government consumption to GDP ratio
sb B/(Py)0.44 Public debt to GDP ratio
1+µη/ (1 + η)1.2 Gross value-added markup
θ 17.5/4 Degree of price stickiness
A 0.0111 Parameter of transaction cost function
s(v)=Av + B/v − 2
√
AB
B 0.07524 Parameter of transaction cost function
λg 0.9 Serial correlation of loggt
σ g 0.0302 Standard deviation of innovation to lngt
λz 0.82 Serial correlation of technology shock
σ z 0.0229 Standard deviation of innovation to lnzt
Note. The time unit is a year. The variable y ≡ zh denotes steady-state output.
We assume that the single-period utility index is of the form
U(c,h)=l n ( c)+δ ln(1 − h).
10We set the preference parameter δ so that in the ﬂexible-price steady state households allocate 20
percent of their time to work. The resulting parameter value is δ =2 .9.6
To calibrate the price elasticity of demand η, we use the fact that in a ﬂexible price equilibrium
the markup of prices over marginal costs is related to the price elasticity of demand as 1 + µ =
η/(1 + η). Drawing from the empirical study of Basu and Fernald (1997), we assign a value of 0.2
to the value added markup of prices over marginal cost, µ. Basu and Fernald estimate gross output
production functions and obtain estimates for the gross output markup of about 1.1. They show
that their estimates are consistent with values for the value added markup of up to 25 percent.
To calibrate the degree of price stickiness, we use Sbordone’s (1998)estimate of a linear new-
Keynesian Phillips curve. Such a Phillips curve arises in our model from a log-linearization of
equilibrium condition (18)around a zero-inﬂation steady state:




where a circumﬂex denotes log-deviations from the steady state. Using quarterly postwar U.S. data,
Sbordone estimates the coeﬃcient θµ/h to be 17.5. Given our calibration h =0 .2a n dµ =0 .2,
we have that the price-stickiness coeﬃcient θ is 17.5. As pointed out by Sbordone, in a Calvo-Yun
staggered price setting model, this value of θ implies that ﬁrms change their price on average every
9 months. Because in our model the time unit is a year, we set θ equal to 17.5/4.
We use the following speciﬁcation for the transactions cost technology:
s(v)=Av + B/v − 2
√
AB (30)
This functional form implies a satiation point for consumption-based money velocity, v,e q u a lt o  











Note that money demand has a unit elasticity with respect to consumption expenditures. This
feature is a consequence of the assumption that transaction costs, cs(c/m), are homogenous of
degree one in consumption and real balances and is independent of the particular functional form
assumed for s(.). Further, as the parameter B approaches zero, the transaction cost function s(.)
becomes linear in velocity and the demand for money adopts the Baumol-Tobin square root form
with respect to the opportunity cost of holding money, (R−1)/R. That is, the log-log elasticity of
money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate converges to 1/2, as B vanishes.
To identify the parameters A and B, we estimate this equation using quarterly U.S. data from
1960:1 to 1999:3. We measure v as the ratio of non-durable consumption and services expenditures
to M1. The nominal interest rate is taken to be the three-month Treasury Bill rate. The OLS
estimate implies that A =0 .0111 and B =0 .07524.7 At the calibrated steady-state interest rate
of 8.2 percent per year, the implied semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal
interest rate (∂ lnm/∂R)is equal to -2.82. When the nominal interest rate is zero, our money
demand speciﬁcation implies a ﬁnite semi-elasticity equal to -6.6.
Government spending, gt, and labor productivity, zt, are assumed to follow independent AR(1)
processes in their logarithms,




t distributes N(0,σ  g)
6See Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a) for a derivation of the exact relations used to identify δ.
7The estimated equation is v
2
t =6 .77 + 90.03(Rt − 1)/Rt.T h e t-statistics for the constant and slope of the
regression are, respectively, 6.81 and 5.64; The ¯ R
2 of the regression is 0.16. Instrumental variable estimates using
three lagged values of the dependent and independent variables yield similar estimates for A and B.
11and
lnzt = λz lnzt−1 +  z
t;  z
t distributes N(0,σ  z)
We assume that (λg,σ  g)=( 0 .9,0.03)and that ( λz,σ  z)=( 0 .82,0.02). This speciﬁcation is in line
with the calibration of the stochastic processes for gt and zt given in Chari et al. (1995). Table 1
summarizes the calibration of the economy.
4.2 Numerical Results
In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a)we show that under ﬂexible prices (with and without imperfect
competition)it is possible to ﬁnd an exact numerical solution to the Ramsey problem. The reason
is that in that case the constraints of the Ramsey problem reduce to a static feasibility constraint
and a single intertemporal, time-separable, implementability constraint. On the other hand, when
price adjustment is sluggish and the government issues only nominal state non-contingent debt, the
Ramsey problem contains a sequence of intertemporal implementability constraints, one for each
date and state. This complication renders impossible the task of ﬁndingan exact numerical solution.
One is thus forced to resort to approximation techniques. In this section we limit attention to results
based on log-linear approximations to the Ramsey planner’s optimality conditions. In section 7,
we present results based on a second-order approximation to the Ramsey planner’s decision rules.
We show there that the results of this section are robust to higher-order approximations.
Table 2 displays a number of sample moments of key macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey
policy. The moments are computed as follows. We ﬁrst generate simulated time series of length T
for the variables of interest and compute ﬁrst and second moments. We repeat this procedure J
times and then compute the average of the moments. In the table, T equals 100 years and J equals
500. In section 7 we explain the criterion for choosing these two parameter values.
The top panel of table 2 corresponds to a ﬂexible-price economy with perfect competition (θ =0
and η = −∞), the middle panel to a ﬂexible-price economy with imperfect competition (θ =0 ,
η = −6), and the bottom panel to an economy with sluggish price adjustment and imperfect
competition (θ =1 7 .5/4a n dη = −6).
4.2.1 Optimal Inﬂation Volatility under Price Flexibility
Under ﬂexible prices and perfect competition, the nominal interest rate is constant and equal to
zero. That is, the Friedman rule is optimal. Because under perfect competition the nominal interest
rate is zero at all times, the distortion introduced by the transaction cost is driven to zero in the
Ramsey allocation (s(v)=s (v)= 0) . On the other hand, distortionary income taxes are far from
zero. The average value of the labor income tax rate is 18.7 percent. The Ramsey planner keeps
this distortion smooth over the business cycle; the standard deviation of τ is 0.04 percentage points.
In the Ramsey allocation with perfect competition and ﬂexible prices, inﬂation is on average
negative (-3.7 percent per year). The most striking feature of the Ramsey allocation is the high
volatility of inﬂation. A two-standard deviation band on each side of the mean features a deﬂation
rate of 15.7 percent at the lower end and inﬂation of 8.3 percent at the upper end. The Ramsey
planner uses the inﬂation rate as a state-contingent lump-sum tax/transfer on households’ ﬁnancial
wealth. This lump-sum tax/transfer is used mainly in response to unanticipated changes in the state
of the economy. This is reﬂected in the fact that inﬂation displays a near zero serial correlation.
The result that in the Ramsey equilibrium inﬂation acts as a lump-sum tax on nominal wealth is
due to Chari et al. (1991)and has recently been stressed by Sims (2001) .
12Table 2: Dynamic Properties of the Ramsey Allocation (Linear Approximation)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Auto. corr. Corr(x,y) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,z)
Flexible Prices and Perfect Competition (θ =0and η = −∞)
τ 18.7 0.044 0.834 -0.322 0.844 -0.516
π -3.66 6.04 -0.0393 -0.245 0.313 -0.321
R 0 0 – – – –
y 0.25 0.00843 0.782 1 0.203 0.975
h 0.25 0.00217 0.834 -0.322 0.846 -0.516
c 0.21 0.00827 0.778 0.955 -0.0797 0.997
Flexible Prices and Imperfect Competition (θ =0 )
τ 25.8 0.0447 0.616 0.236 -0.845 0.511
π -1.82 6.8 -0.0411 -0.207 0.329 -0.321
R 1.83 0.0313 0.797 -0.237 0.845 -0.513
y 0.208 0.00675 0.783 1 0.289 0.951
h 0.208 0.0024 0.833 -0.237 0.845 -0.513
c 0.168 0.00645 0.777 0.93 -0.0624 0.998
Baseline Sticky-Price Economy
τ 25.1 0.998 0.743 -0.283 0.476 -0.238
π -0.16 0.171 0.0372 -0.123 0.385 -0.289
R 3.85 0.562 0.865 -0.949 -0.0372 -0.969
y 0.209 0.00713 0.815 1 0.199 0.943
h 0.208 0.00253 0.813 -0.124 0.611 -0.424
c 0.168 0.00707 0.819 0.938 -0.131 0.958
Note. τ, π,a n dR are expressed in percentage points and y, h,a n dc in levels. Unless
indicated otherwise, the parameter values are: β =1 /1.04, δ =2 .9, g =0 .04, b−1 =
0.088, η = −6, θ =1 7 .5/4, A =0 .0111, B =0 .07524,
T = 100, and J = 500.
13The high volatility and low persistence of the inﬂation rate stands in sharp contrast to the
smooth and highly persistent behavior of the labor income tax rate. Our results on the dynamic
properties of the Ramsey economy under perfect competition and ﬂexible prices are consistent with
those obtained by Chari et al. (1991).
Under imperfect competition and ﬂexible prices, the volatility and correlation properties of
inﬂation, income tax rates, and other real variables are virtually unchanged. The main eﬀect of
imperfect competition is that the Friedman rule ceases to be optimal. The average nominal interest
rate rises from zero to 1.8 percent. The reason for this departure from the Friedman rule is the
presence of monopoly proﬁts. As shown in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a)these proﬁts represent
pure rents for the owners of the monopoly rights, which the Ramsey planner would like to tax at a
hundred percent rate. If proﬁt taxes are either unavailable or restricted to be less than one hundred
percent, then the social planner uses inﬂation as an indirect tax on proﬁts. Inﬂation acts as an
indirect tax on proﬁts because when consumers transform proﬁts into consumption, they must hold
money to perform the required transaction. The Friedman rule reemerges if (a)monopoly proﬁts
are completely conﬁscated; (b)proﬁt tax rates are constrained to be equal to income tax rates; (c)
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms make no proﬁts (as could be the case in the presence of ﬁxed
costs); and (d) the Ramsey planner has access to consumption taxes.8 Another diﬀerence between
the perfectly and imperfectly competitive economies is that in the latter the average income tax rate
is 7 percentage points higher than in the former, even though initial public debt and the process
for government purchases are the same in both economies. The reason for this diﬀerence is that
under imperfect competition, the labor income tax base is smaller due to the presence of market
power.
4.2.2 Optimal Inﬂation Volatility under Price Stickiness
If price changes are brought about at a cost, then it is natural to expect that a benevolent govern-
ment will try to implement policies consistent with a more stable behavior of prices than when price
changes are costless. However, the quantitative eﬀect of an empirically plausible degree of price
rigidity on optimal inﬂation volatility is not clear a priori. When price adjustment is costly, the
social planner faces a tradeoﬀ. On the one hand, the planner would like to use unexpected changes
in the price level as a state-contingent lump-sum tax or transfer on nominal wealth. In this way,
the benevolent government avoids the need to resort to changes in distortionary taxes and interest
rates over the business cycle. The use of inﬂation for this purpose would imply a relatively large
volatility in prices. On the other hand, the Ramsey planner has incentives to stabilize the price
level in order to minimize the costs associated with nominal price changes. The bottom panel of
table 2 shows that for the degree of stickiness that has been estimated for the U.S. economy, this
tradeoﬀ is to a large extent resolved in favor of price stability. The Ramsey allocation features a
dramatic drop in the standard deviation of inﬂation from about 7 percent per year under ﬂexible
prices to a mere 0.17 percent per year when prices adjust sluggishly.9 This implication of the Ram-
sey allocation under sticky prices is more in accord with the recent neo-Keynesian literature on
optimal monetary policy that ignores ﬁscal considerations (see the references cited in footnote 2).10
8For a formal derivation of these results and a more detailed discussion, see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a).
9Siu (2001) obtains similar results in a cash-credit economy where nominal rigidities are introduced by assuming
that a fraction of ﬁrms must set their price one period in advance and the only source of uncertainty are government
purchases shocks.
10An important assumption driving the result that signiﬁcantly less inﬂation volatility is desirable in the presence of
sticky prices is that government debt is state-noncontingent. When government debt is state contingent, the presence
of sticky prices may introduce no diﬀerence in the Ramsey real allocation (see Correia et al., 2001). The reason for
this result is that, as shown in Lucas and Stokey (1983), when government debt is state contingent and prices are fully
14Figure 1: Degree of Price Stickiness and Optimal Inﬂation Volatility
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The baseline value of θ is 4.4. The standard deviation of inﬂation is measured in percent per
year.
Indeed the impact of price stickiness on the optimal degree of inﬂation volatility turns out to be
much stronger than suggested by the numbers in table 2. Figure 1 shows that a minimum amount
of price stickiness suﬃces to make price stability the central goal of optimal policy. Speciﬁcally,
when the degree of price stickiness, embodied in the parameter θ, is assumed to be 10 times smaller
than the estimated value for the U.S. economy, the optimal volatility of inﬂation is below 0.52
percent per year, 13 times smaller than under full price ﬂexibility.
Therefore, the question arises as to why even a marginal degree of price stickiness can turn
undesirable the use of a seemingly powerful ﬁscal instrument, such as large re- or devaluations of
private real ﬁnancial wealth through surprise inﬂation. Our conjecture is that in the ﬂexible-price
economy, the welfare gains of surprise inﬂations or deﬂations are very small. Our intuition is as
follows. Under ﬂexible prices, it is optimal for the central bank to keep the nominal interest rate
constant over the business cycle. This means that large surprise inﬂations must be as likely as
large deﬂations, as variations in real interest rates are small. In other words, inﬂation must have
a near-i.i.d. behavior. As a result, high inﬂation volatility cannot be used by the Ramsey planner
to reduce the average amount of resources to be collected via distortionary income taxes, which
would be a ﬁrst-order eﬀect. The volatility of inﬂation serves primarily the purpose of smoothing
the process of income tax distortions—a second-order source of welfare losses—without aﬀecting
their average level.
An additional way to gain intuition for the dramatic decline in optimal inﬂation volatility
that takes place even at very modest levels of price stickiness is to interpret price volatility as
a way for the government to introduce real state-contingent public debt. Under ﬂexible prices
the government uses state-contingent changes in the price level as a non-distorting tax or transfer
ﬂexible, the Ramsey allocation does not pin down the price level uniquely. In this case there is an inﬁnite number
of price level processes (and thus of money supply processes) that can be supported as Ramsey outcomes. Loosely
speaking, the introduction of price stickiness simply ‘uses this degree of freedom’ without altering other aspects of
the Ramsey solution. This is not possible under state-noncontingent debt. For in this case the price level is uniquely
determined in the ﬂexible-price economy. Thus, the presence of nominal rigidities modiﬁes the optimal real allocation
in fundamental ways.
15on private holdings of government assets. In this way, non-state contingent nominal public debt
becomes state-contingent in real terms. So, for example, in response to an unexpected increase
in government spending (a war, say)the Ramsey planner does not need to increase tax rates
by much because by inﬂating away part of the public debt he can ensure intertemporal budget
balance. It is therefore clear that introducing costly price adjustment is as if the government was
limited in its ability to issue real state-contingent debt. It follows that the larger is the welfare
gain associated with the ability to issue real state-contingent public debt—as opposed to non-state
contingent debt—the larger is the amount of price stickiness required to reduce the optimal degree
of inﬂation volatility. Recent work by Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2000)shows that indeed the
level of welfare under the Ramsey policy in an economy without real state-contingent public debt is
virtually the same as in an economy with state-contingent debt. Our ﬁnding that a small amount
of price stickiness is all it takes to bring the optimal volatility of inﬂation from a very large level
to near zero is thus perfectly in line with the ﬁnding of Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala.
If this intuition is correct, then the behavior of tax rates and public debt under sticky prices
should resemble that implied by the Ramsey allocation in economies without real state-contingent
debt. We will investigate this issue further in the next section.
5 Near Random Walk Property of Taxes and Public Debt under
Sticky Prices
Lucas and Stokey (1983)show that under state contingent government debt tax rates and public
debt inherit the stochastic process of the underlying exogenous shocks. This implies, for example,
that if the shocks driving business cycles are serially uncorrelated, so are government bonds and tax
rates. The work of Barro (1979)and more recently Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2000)suggests
that the Lucas and Stokey result hinges on the assumption that the government can issue state-
contingent debt. These authors show that independently of the assumed process for the shocks
generating aggregate ﬂuctuations, tax rates and public debt exhibit near random walk behavior.
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991)show that the Ramsey allocation of a ﬂexible price economy
with nominally non-state-contingent debt behaves exactly like that of an economy with real state-
contingent debt. It follows that under ﬂexible prices and state non-contingent nominal debt, tax
rates and government bonds inherit the stochastic process of the exogenous shocks.
In this section we investigate the extent to which the introduction of nominal rigidities brings
the Ramsey allocation closer to the one arising in an economy without real state contingent debt. In
other words, we wish to ﬁnd out whether the Barro-Marcet-Sargent-Seppala result can be obtained,
not by ruling out complete markets for real public debt, but instead by introducing sticky prices
in an economy in which the government issues only non-state-contingent nominal debt.
To this end, we consider the response of the ﬂexible- and sticky-price economies under optimal
ﬁscal and monetary policy to a serially uncorrelated government purchases shock. The result is
displayed in ﬁgure 2. The response of the ﬂexible price economy is shown with a dashed line and
the response of the sticky price economy with a solid line. Government purchases are assumed
to increase by 3 percent (one standard deviation)in period 1. Under ﬂexible prices and perfect
competition (the case considered by Chari, et al.), taxes and bonds, like the shock itself, return
after one period to their pre-shock values. By contrast, under sticky prices both variables are
permanently aﬀected by the shock. Speciﬁcally, when prices are sticky, bonds and taxes jump up
on impact and then converge to values above their pre-shock levels. The diﬀerence in behavior under
the two model speciﬁcations can be explained entirely by the behavior of the price level. Under
ﬂexible prices, the Ramsey planner inﬂates away part of the real value of outstanding nominal
16Figure 2: Impulse response to an iid government purchases shock








































— sticky-price model - - - ﬂexible prices and perfect competition
Note: The size of the innovation in government purchases is one standard deviation (3
percent increase in g). The shock takes place in period 1. Public debt, consumption,
and output are measured in percent deviations from their pre-shock levels. The tax rate,
the nominal interest rate, and the inﬂation rate are measured in percentage points.
17Figure 3: Degree of Price Stickiness and Deviations from the Friedman Rule
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The baseline value of θ is 4.4. The nominal interest rate is measured as percent per year.
debt, bringing real public debt to its pre-shock level in just one period. Under sticky prices, the
government ﬁnds it optimal not to increase the price level much. This is because price increases
are costly. Instead, the planner ﬁnances the increase in government spending partly by increasing
public debt and partly by increasing taxes. In order to avoid a large distortion at the time of the
shock, the planner smoothes the tax increase over time. As a consequence, the stock of public debt
displays a persistent increase.
Thus, our sticky price model appears to replicate the near random walk behavior of bonds
and tax rates found under the Ramsey allocation in real models without state-contingent debt, the
Barro-Marcet-Sargent-Seppala result. Indeed, the Barro-Marcet-Sargent-Seppala result obtains not
only under the baseline calibration of the degree of price stickiness (i.e., θ =1 7 .5/4, or ﬁrms change
prices once every 9 months), but for a minimal degree of nominal rigidities. Speciﬁcally, if we
reduce θ by a factor of 10, bonds and tax rates maintain their near-random-walk behavior. This
result is consistent with ﬁgure 1, which documents that a small amount of price rigidity suﬃces to
bring the volatility of inﬂation close to zero.
6 Price Stickiness and Deviations from the Friedman Rule
In our baseline sticky-price economy the Friedman rule fails to hold. The average nominal interest
rate is 3.8 percent per year. This signiﬁcant deviation from the Friedman rule can be decomposed
in two parts. First, as shown by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a), the presence of monopolistic
competition induces the social planner to tax money balances as an indirect way to tax monopoly
proﬁts. Comparing the top and middle panels of table 2, it follows that imperfect competition
induces a deviation from the Friedman rule of 1.8 percentage points per year. Comparing the
middle and bottom panels, it then follows that in our baseline economy price stickiness explains
half of the 3.8 percentage points by which the nominal interest rate deviates from the Friedman
rule. Indeed, as ﬁgure 3 illustrates, there exists a strong increasing relationship between the degree
of price stickiness and the average nominal interest rate associated with the Ramsey allocation.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The more costly it is for ﬁrms to alter nominal prices,
18Table 3: Accuracy of the approximate numerical solution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Auto. corr. Mean Std. Dev. Auto. corr.
Flexible Prices and Perfect Competition
Exact Solution Log-Linear Approximation
τ 18.8 0.0491 0.88 18.7 0.044 0.834
π -3.39 7.47 -0.0279 -3.66 6.04 -0.0393
R 0 0 – 0 0 –
Flexible Prices and Imperfect Competition
Exact Solution Log-Linear Approximation
τ 26.6 0.042 0.88 25.8 0.0447 0.616
π -1.46 7.92 -0.0239 -1.82 6.8 -0.0411
R 1.95 0.0369 0.88 1.83 0.0313 0.797
Baseline Sticky-Price Economy
Log-Quadratic Approximation Log-Linear Approximation
τ 25.3 0.908 0.719 25.1 0.998 0.743
π -0.148 0.206 0.237 -0.16 0.171 0.0372
R 3.82 0.689 0.892 3.85 0.562 0.865
Note. τ, π,a n dR are expressed in percentage points.
the closer to zero is the inﬂation rate chosen by the benevolent government.
7 Accuracy of Solution
The quantitative results presented thus far are based on a log-linear approximation to the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the Ramsey problem. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a)we show how to
compute exact numerical solutions to the Ramsey problem in the ﬂexible-price economies (with
perfectly and imperfectly competitive product markets). The availability of exact solutions allows
us to evaluate the accuracy of the log-linear solution for the ﬂexible-price economies considered
above. The top and middle panels of table 3 shows that the quantitative results obtained using the
exact numerical solution and a log-linear approximation are remarkably close. The most noticeable
diﬀerence concerns the standard deviation of inﬂation. The log-linear approximation underpredicts
the optimal volatility of inﬂation by one percentage point.
Next we gauge the accuracy of the log-linear approximation to the sticky-price Ramsey alloca-
tion by comparing it to results based on a log-quadratic approximation. The quadratic approxi-
mation technique we used is described in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001b). The results shown in
the bottom panel of table 3 suggest that the log-linear and log-quadratic approximations deliver
similar quantitative results. In particular, the dramatic decline in inﬂation volatility vis-a-vis the
ﬂexible-price economy also arises under the higher-order approximation.
We close our discussion of numerical accuracy by pointing out that in both the ﬂexible- and
sticky-price economies the ﬁrst-order approximation to the Ramsey allocation features a unit root.
As a result, the local approximation techniques employed here become more inaccurate the longer
is the simulated time series used to compute sample moments. The reason is that in the long run
the log-linearized equilibrium system is bound to wander far away from the point around which
19the approximation is taken. We choose to restrict attention to time series of length 100 years
because for this sample size the log-linear model of the ﬂexible-price economy performs well in
comparison to the exact solution. The need to keep the length of the time series relatively short
also applies when a log-quadratic approximation is used. If the system deviates far from the point
of approximation, then the quadratic terms might introduce large errors. These discrepancies can
render the quadratic approximation even more imprecise than the lower-order one. The quadratic
approximation is guaranteed to perform better than the linear one only if the system’s dynamics
are close enough to the point around which the model is approximated.
8 Interest-Rate Feedback Rules
In this section we address the question of whether the time series arising from the Ramsey allocation
imply a relation between the nominal interest rate, inﬂation, and output consistent with available
estimates of such relationship for U.S. data. In recent years there has been a revival of empirical
and theoretical research aimed at understanding the macroeconomic consequences of monetary
policy regimes that take the form of interest-rate feedback rules. One driving force of this renewed
interest can be found in empirical studies showing that in the past two decades monetary policy
in the United States is well described as following such a rule. In particular, an inﬂuential paper
by Taylor (1993)characterizes the Federal Reserve as following a simple rule whereby the federal
funds rate is set as a linear function of inﬂation and the output gap with coeﬃcients of 1.5 and
0.5, respectively. Taylor emphasizes the stabilizing role of an inﬂation coeﬃcient greater than
unity, which loosely speaking implies that the central bank raises real interest rates in response
to increases in the rate of inﬂation. After his seminal paper, interest-rate feedback rules with
this feature have become known as Taylor rules. Taylor rules have also been shown to represent
an adequate description of monetary policy in other industrialized economies (see, for example,
Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 1998).
To see whether the nominal interest rate process associated with the Ramsey allocation can
be well represented by a linear combination of inﬂation and output, we estimate the following
regression using artiﬁcial time series from the sticky-price model.
Rt = β0 + β1πt + β2yt + ut.
Here the nominal interest rate, Rt, and inﬂation, πt, are measured in percent per year, and output,
yt, is measured as percent deviation from its mean value. To generate time series for Rt, πt,
and yt, we draw artiﬁcial time series of size 100 for the two shocks driving business cycles in our
model, government consumption and productivity shocks. We use these realizations to compute
the implied time series of the endogenous variables of interest using the baseline calibration of the
sticky-price model. We then proceed to estimate the above equation. We repeat this procedure
500 times and take the median of the estimated regression coeﬃcients. The OLS estimate of the
interest rate feedback rule is
Rt =0 .04 − 0.14πt − 0.16yt + ut; R2 =0 .92.
Clearly, an interest rate feedback rule ﬁts quite well the optimal interest rate process. The R2
coeﬃcient of the regression is above 90 percent. However, the estimated interest-rate feedback rule
does not resemble a Taylor rule. First, the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is less than unity, and indeed
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a negative point estimate. Second, the output coeﬃcient is
negative. The results are essentially unchanged if one estimates the feedback rule by instrumental
variables using lagged values of π, y,a n dR as instruments. Thus, an econometrician working with
20a data sampled from the Ramsey economy would conclude that monetary policy is passive, in the
sense that the interest rate does not seem to react to changes in the rate of inﬂation.
The results are also insensitive to the introduction of a smoothing term ` a la Sack (1998)in the
above interest-rate rule. Speciﬁcally, adding the nominal interest rate with one lag to the set of
explanatory variables yields
Rt =0 .03 + 0.15πt − 0.11yt +0 .34Rt−1 + ut; R2 =0 .96.
One issue that has attracted the attention of both empirical and theoretical studies on interest-
rate feedback rules is whether the central bank looks at contemporaneous or past measures of
inﬂation. It turns out that in our Ramsey economy, a backward-looking rule also features an
inﬂation coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly less than one. Speciﬁcally, replacing πt with πt−1 in our original
speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule we obtain
Rt =0 .04 + 0.21πt−1 − 0.16yt + ut; R2 =0 .92.
We close this section by pointing out that the results should not be interpreted as suggesting
that optimal monetary policy can be implemented by passive interest-rate feedback rules like the
ones estimated above. In order to arrive at such conclusion, one would have, in addition, to identify
the underlying ﬁscal regime. Then, one would have to check whether in a competitive equilibrium
where the government follows the resulting monetary/ﬁscal regime, welfare of the representative
household is close enough to that obtained under the Ramsey allocation. An obvious problem
that one might encounter in performing this exercise is that the competitive equilibrium fails to be
unique at the estimated policy regime. This is a matter that deserves further investigation.
9C o n c l u s i o n
The focus of this paper is the study of the implications of price stickiness for the optimal degree of
price volatility. The economic environment considered features a government that does not have
access to lump-sum taxation and can only issue nominally risk-free debt. The central ﬁnding is
that for plausible calibrations of the degree of nominal rigidity the volatility of inﬂation associated
with the Ramsey allocation is near zero. Indeed, a very small amount of price stickiness suﬃces to
make the optimal inﬂation volatility many times lower than that arising under full price ﬂexibility.
Our results show that when prices are sticky, the social planner abandons the use of price
surprises as a shock absorber of unexpected innovations in the ﬁscal budget. Instead the government
chooses to rely more heavily on changes in income tax rates. The benevolent government minimizes
the distortions introduced by these tax changes by spreading them over time. The resulting tax
smoothing behavior induces a near random walk property in tax rates and public debt. This
characteristic of the Ramsey real allocation under sticky prices resembles that of economies where
the government can issue only non-state-contingent debt, like the ones studied by Barro (1979)and
Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2000).
Our results suggest that the fragility of the use of the price level as a shock absorber is not
limited to the introduction of small degrees of nominal rigidities. Any friction that causes changes
in the equilibrium real allocation in response to innovations in the price level is likely to induce
the Ramsey planner to refrain from using the price level as an instrument to front-load taxation.
Examples of such frictions could be informational rigidities as in Lucas (1972)and Mankiw and
Reis (2001)and costs of adjusting the composition of ﬁnancial portfolios, as in limited participation
models (Fuerst, 1991; Lucas, 1990). We plan to explore these ideas further in future research. If this
21conjecture is correct, our sticky-price model is simply a metaphor to illustrate a deeper mechanism
at work in the macroeconomy that leads central banks all over the world to favor price stability
above any other goal of monetary policy.
22Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that plans {ct,h t,v t,π t,λ t,b t,mc t} satisfying (13)-(23) also satisfy (24) (25), (26)
vt ≥ v,a n dv2
ts (vt) < 1. It follows from the deﬁnition of ρ(vt)and (15)that ρ(vt)=Rt.I t i s
easy to see then that (15), (17), and assumption 1 together imply that vt ≥ v and v2
ts (vt) < 1.
Taking expectations conditional on information available at time t of (16), using the deﬁnition of
ρ(vt) , and combining it with (17)one obtains (24) . To obtain (25)divide (19)by Pt. Solve (14)
for τt and use the resulting expression to eliminate τt from (19). Use (23) to replace Mt/Pt and
let bt = Bt/Pt. Finally, multiply and divide (20)by Pt+j and replace qt+j+1 with (21)and (16) .
Multiply by λt/(qtPt)to get(26) .
Next, we must show that for any plan {ct,h t,v t,π t,λ t,b t,mc t} satisfying (13), (18), (22), (24)
(25), (26) and vt ≥ v,a n dv2
ts (vt) < 1 one can construct plans {Mt, Bt, qt, rt+1,τ t,R t} so that
(14)-(17), (19)-(21), and (23) hold at all dates and under all contingencies. Set τt such that (14)
holds. Set Rt = ρ(vt). It follows from the deﬁnition of ρ(vt)that (15)holds. Assumption 1, the
constraints vt ≥ v and v2
ts (vt) < 1 ensure that Rt ≥ 1. Let rt+1 be given by (16). Taking expected
value and comparing the resulting expression to (24)shows that (17)is satisﬁed. With rt in hand,
let qt be given by (21). Using Bt = btPt and (23)to write Mt/Pt = ct/vt, and the deﬁnition of
τt we recover (19). Let Pt = πtPt−1 and recall that P−1 is given. Multiply (26)by qtPt/λt.N o t e
that qtPtλtβjλt+j+1/πt+j+1 using (16)and (21)can be expressed as qt+j+1Pt+j. Finally, replace
ct+j/vt+j with (23)to obtain (20)
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− πt(πt − 1)
 
+ λc
t[Uc(ct,h t) − λtγ(vt)]}
First-Order Conditions of the Ramsey problem for t ≥ 1
ztht =[ 1+s(vt)]ct + gt +
θ
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First-Order Conditions of the Ramsey Problem at time 0
ztht =[ 1+s(vt)]ct + gt +
θ
2
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Steady State of the Ramsey Economy
Assume that bt = b−1 for all t and that xt = xt−1 = xt+1 = x for all endogenous and exogenous
variables. Also, z = 1. Note that the steady-state value of the marginal cost mct = wt/zt is simply
w.
h =[ 1+s(v)]c + g +
θ
2






























Uc − λf[1 + s(v)]+
λs
v
+ λshγ(v)Mc − β
λs
vπ
+ λcUcc = 0 (62)

















π(π − 1) − λcγ(v)= 0 (64)













− λcλγ (v)= 0 (65)
−λfθ(π − 1)+ λbρ(v)
λ
π2 + λsρ(v)b + c/v







Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst show that plans {ct,h t,v t,π t,b t,mc t} satisfying (13)-(23) also satisfy (27)-(29), vt ≥ v,
and v2
ts (vt) < 1. It follows from the deﬁnition of ρ(vt)and (15)that ρ(vt)=Rt.I ti se a s yt os e e
then that (15), (17), and assumption 1 together imply that vt ≥ v and v2
ts (vt) < 1. To obtain
(27)divide (18)by λt and then use (13)to eliminate λt. Next divide (19)by Pt. Solve (14)for
τt and use the resulting expression to eliminate τt from (19). Use (23) to replace Mt/Pt and let
bt = Bt/Pt. This yields (28). For any t,j ≥ 0, (19)can be written as
Mt+j + Bt+j + τt+jPt+jzt+jmct+jht+j = Rt+j−1Bt+j−1 + Mt+j−1 + Pt+jgt+j
Let Wt+j+1 = Rt+jBt+j + Mt+j and note that Wt+j+1 is in the information set of time t + j.U s e
this expression to eliminate Bt+j from (19)and multiply by qt+j to obtain
qt+jMt+j(1 − R−1
t+j)+qt+jEt+jrt+j+1Wt+j+1 − qt+jWt+j = qt+j[Pt+jgt+j − τt+jPt+jmct+jzt+jht+j],
26w h e r ew eu s e( 1 7 )t ow r i t eRt+j in terms of rt+j+1. Take expectations conditional on information






t+j) − qt+j(Pt+jgt+j − τt+jPt+jmct+jzt+jht+j)
 
= −Etqt+J+1Wt+J+1 + qtWt.
Take limits for J →∞ . By (20)the limit of the right hand side is well deﬁned and equal to qtWt.






t+j) − qt+j(Pt+jgt+j − τt+jPt+jmct+jzt+jht+j)
 
= qtWt


















Solve (14)for τt+j.T h e nτt+jmct+jzt+jht+j = mct+jzt+jht+j+γ(vt+j)/Uc(ct+j,h t+j)Uh(ct+j,h t+j)ht+j.




























Finally, use (15)to replace (1 − R−1
t+j)/vt+j with vt+js (vt+j)and use the deﬁnitions of φ(vt)
and Wt to get (29).
We next show that that plans {ct,h t,v t,π t,b t,mc t} satisfying (22), (27)-(29), and vt ≥ v,a n d
v2
ts (vt) < 1 also satisfy (13)-(23). Construct λt so that it satisﬁes (13). Let τt be given by (14). Let
Rt be given by (15). Let rt+1 be given by (16). Let qt be given by (21)and Mt/Pt by (23). By the
same arguments given in the proof of Proposition 2 on can show that (18)and (19)then hold. Thus,
what remains to be shown is that (17)and (20)are satisﬁed. Note that Rt = ρ(vt)=1 /[1−v2
t s (vt)],
then the restriction vt ≥ v and v2
ts (vt) < 1 and assumption 1 imply that Rt ≥ 1. Write (29)as






























Make a change of index h = j − 1.





























Using (29)this expression can be simpliﬁed to read:





























.T h i s
yields



















Multiply by Ptγ(vt)/Uc(ct,h t)and replace θ/2(πt − 1)2 with (22). Combine (15) with (23) to
express , ct/vt(v2
ts (vt)) as Mt/Pt(1−R−1
t ). Finally, use (14) to replace Uh/Ucγ(vt)ht. The resulting
expression is
Mt(1 − R−1
t )+τPtmctztht − Ptgt + Etrt+1(Mt + RtBt)=Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 (73)
Subtracting (19)from this expression it follows that (17)must hold. Finally, we must show that
(20)holds. Multiply (19)in period t + j by qt+j and take information conditional on information
available at time t to get
Et[qt+jMt+j(1 − rt+j+1)+qt+j+1Wt+j+1]=Et[qt+jWt+j + qt+j(Pt+jgt+j − τt+jPt+jwt+jht+j)]











[(ct+j/vt+j)(1 − rt+j+1) − (gt+j − τt+jwt+jht+j)]= −Etqt+J+1Wt+J+1/(qtPt)+
Wt
Pt
It follows from (29)that the limit of the left-hand side of the above expression as J →∞is Wt/Pt.




for every date t. Using the deﬁnition of Wt, one obtains immediately (20).
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